Earlier this year, what caught the attention of the theater was that a series of bizarre and high-profile incidents occurred at Anderson Air Force Base in Guam at the end of the winter of 2019. As far as we know, from late February to early March last year, large-scale installations experienced multiple incursions by unmanned aircraft. This is a highly sensitive area of highly strategic bases, namely the U.S. Army’s terminal high-altitude area defense (( THAAD) batteries, used to protect islands from ballistic missile attacks.
These incursions are said to have occurred in late March 2019 and early April 2019. Personnel guard towers have been observed. These towers stand on the highly secure THAAD area at the northern end of the air base, usually called the “Northwest Territories. “Andersen himself occupied the entire north and west of the island.
Andersen Air Force Base occupied the entire northwestern tip of Guam. The air base is located in the southwest, and the weapons storage area and other important locations are located in the northwest. The THAAD battery is located near the northwestern part of the base where there are runway-like abandoned features.
The invading spacecraft are described as “quadcopter-style” vehicles with bright spotlights. They fly over the water and then over the northwest base area at a height no higher than tree top level and approximately 20 to 30 feet above the ground. On many nights, ships will make multiple incursions early in the morning. They will appear, disappear, and then come back in a few hours.
The spotlight emitted from the spacecraft makes it difficult for personnel to describe the spacecraft in detail, although the spotlight is estimated to range from three to five feet in diameter based on its size. The aircraft will maneuver dynamically, appear under the spotlight, and then disappear, but later reappears on one side or the other under the spotlight, making the witnesses uneasy. It is said that people have made joint efforts to identify, track and trace this mysterious spacecraft, but based on our understanding of the incident, these efforts seem to be unsuccessful.
This information is very interesting and did not even shock people, but we must find conclusive evidence that at least something similar did happen during this time.
The theater was able to confirm at least one of the above incidents through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Based on this, we obtained a copy of the relevant record from the internal criminal recorder of the 36th Security Force Squadron of the Air Force. This unit is part of the 36th Wing of Andersen Air Force Base.
The entry describes the “possible drone” as “unknown color and size with bright white light.” Army personnel from “THAAD Tower 2″ broadcast on “2315″ or 11:15 PM-it is not clear that this is the local time in Guam or Zulu time, also known as Greenwich Mean Time-report “Bright “White light” hovered over the field from [their position] and quickly disappeared. ”
“Tower 2 personnel cannot provide further description,” the blotter entry continued. “In 2318, JET PATROLS conducted covert operations nearby. No JET PATROLS could find suspicious white light.”
The “JET PATROLS” referenced in this document is not an airplane, but the jungle law enforcement team of the 36th Security Force Squadron. The Air Force described the team as “the mission of preventing security breaches, arresting poachers and protecting the borders around the jungle.” The staff of the team walked quietly through the jungle, which infiltrated most of the base at night and had unique human tracking skills. You can read all the information about this professional security force on this official media.
Interestingly, the recorder of the 36th Security Force Squadron listed this incident as “Unauthorized Unmanned Aviation System/Security Incident #2019-2″, which means that there will be at least another one at Andersen Air Force Base until then. A similarly classified drone incident. The calendar or fiscal year at the beginning of 2019. Another FOIA request confirmed that there was a “2019-1″ blotter entry, but the Air Force retained information about the incident on the grounds of privacy and law enforcement immunity. Due to potential risks of exposure-sensitive strategies, technologies or procedures or ongoing investigations, agents usually keep records for law enforcement reasons. Then it is interesting that the incident that occurred near the Army’s THAAD battery in the Northwest Territories in March 2019 was not exempt.
The US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) forwarded a separate FOIA request for this incident (any other similar incident that occurred within the same time frame) to the US Army. The war zone is still waiting for a response to this request, and the Guam Police Department is also waiting. We directly asked the 36th Wing and INDOPACOM, but received no response.
For many reasons, we found this information very disturbing. Most importantly, the spacecraft can traverse the air defense system, which is tasked with protecting highly strategic islands from ballistic missile attacks. In other words, THAAD batteries have largely prevented countries like North Korea from putting the island in danger. The system can even withstand lower traffic barrage from peer competitors (such as China).
In the event of a conflict with the United States, Guam will be close to Beijing’s target list, and the development of Guam’s growing arsenal of ballistic missiles largely denies the United States’ use of its regional bases during the opening phase of the conflict. The island has been directly threatened by the Kim Jong Un regime.
The fact is that destroying enemy air defense systems (DEAD) is not defined by the platform, but a mission. Traditionally, we have associated the goal of destroying enemy air defense systems with stand-off cruise missile attacks and “Wild Weasel” fighter combat, but DEAD can be composed of a team of special operators using some well-placed explosives Or through a series of naval gunfire. Even malicious software that is carefully deployed against the software running on air defense systems and its mechanical components may be sufficiently destructive to be regarded as a DEAD method.
Having said that, America’s outstanding opponents throughout the region will make the capture of THAAD shells on Guam a top priority during the conflict, and even part of the limited display of force. Why use only drones loaded with explosives to fly into ballistic missiles, or try to launch cruise missiles from forward-deployed submarines or even secret commando raids? No, you don’t need some high-end drone systems to perform this operation, because events in the real world have been highlighted many times. The drug cartel is now using ready-made drones to carry improvised explosive devices to hit the enemy, and even the U.S. Allied forces are actually making similar hobby drones for this purpose. Some more complex types can be launched from greater distances, and can even automatically enter radar or other RF radiation sources, such as THAAD’s powerful AN/TPY-2 radar and data link, instead of just hitting a certain spot on the map. Points.
In short, in this case, the “shooting archer” is an advanced anti-ballistic missile system that uses relatively cheap drones to protect the most important strategic base of the United States in the entire region. This is both obvious and obvious. It is a very ironic tactic. The United States can shoot down ballistic missiles, but the key systems used in the past are still extremely vulnerable to the minimal air threat-cheap drones.
For those who follow our work, this is not news. When it comes to the threat of low-end drones, the US military is dangerously detached. We spent many years emphasizing this threat, and at the same time seeing that the U.S. military did little to resist it, until ISIS kept dropping bombs from drones during the Battle of Mosul, Iraq, or simply putting bombs containing explosives. The man-machine is placed in the position of the Allied forces.
Since then, this threat has swelled rapidly as we expected. Drones have attacked forward operating bases, attempting to assassinate the ruling figures through drones, and even produced oil production in Saudi Arabia a year ago. The center successfully carried out a drone attack. In fact, the threat has become so serious that senior U.S. commanders in the field say that there are fierce drones on or near their troops and equipment, which prevents them from working at night.
At the same time, it is very clear that even the most capable air defense systems in the United States are vulnerable to the most insignificant air capabilities (commercially available drones). If there are others, this is another example, but it may be the biggest example of how the US military’s priorities have been misaligned in the past two decades or so of air defense investments. You can learn how the Pentagon allowed its short-range air defense (SHORAD) capabilities to wither on the vines to an alarming degree, while focusing on this characteristic of our past, high-profile, “sexy” and lucrative weapons system. The Pentagon lacks foresight on the emergence of this threat, and has quickly stepped up its efforts to deal with this threat. This kind of dispute is ongoing. Nonetheless, potential US enemies have taken a step forward and are committed to the swarm of low-end drone concepts that will overwhelm most of the current countermeasures.
So what happened here? How did all this lead to other troublesome drone targeting, including the highly similar targeting at US nuclear facilities and other highly restricted airspace, and the continued buzz about unidentified aviation phenomena (UAP)? We will soon bundle the value of all these and other issues in the multi-year report and become a culmination.
At the same time, the events in Guam in 2019 may best remind us of the Pentagon’s attention to high-end threats and the huge gilded weapons program implemented to counter these threats, making these capabilities very vulnerable to far less advanced attacks.
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Post time: Oct-13-2020
